Carney’s goal to double non‑US exports within a decade is directionally right, but the math is brutal without faster execution. The pledge, tied to his October 22 address and framed as C$300 billion more trade, needs policy teeth now, not in 2033.
The government set the target in a prime time speech that also touted new build‑faster laws and a fresh projects office, both meant to move exports beyond the United States’ grip. That framing is credible on paper, but delivery hinges on provinces, ports, pipelines, and buyers outside North America, not slogans in Ottawa. The risk window is immediate, while the benefits compound late. The clock to 2035 already started when he said it in the live address.
Rewire Trade Channels Fast
Washington’s tariffs forced Ottawa to act, then partially unwind countermeasures, which whipsawed firms and slowed capex. Finance detailed the tit‑for‑tat, then later kept only steel, aluminum, and auto measures in place while removing other counter tariffs on September 1, 2025. That policy turn reflects the constraint, the United States still buys roughly three quarters of Canadian exports, and sanctions risk sits outside Ottawa’s control.
Carney’s new dealmaking helps. A September agreement with Indonesia, Canada’s first bilateral with an ASEAN country, starts to open non‑US orders across critical minerals, agri‑food, and services. The PMO release is clear on sectors, but volumes, rules of origin, and dispute pathways will decide if firms actually ship. Ottawa also says it passed the One Canadian Economy Act and launched a Major Projects Office with a first tranche worth C$60 billion, to cut approvals and expand corridors, in that same address.
Execution still needs provinces to harmonize rules and utilities to deliver grid capacity on time, otherwise approvals sit ahead of diggers. Carney acknowledged the structural break with the United States when he said, “This decades‑long process of an ever‑closer economic relationship between the Canadian and U.S. economies is now over.” His words match the mechanism, Canada must convert internal build speed and new trade pacts into booked non‑US revenue, fast.
Recruit Talent, Face Friction
The planned talent strategy leans on a relative edge created by U.S. visa pain, but that edge is narrowing. USCIS shifted H‑1B to a beneficiary‑centric draw and raised the registration fee, then reached the FY‑2026 cap by July 18, 2025.
That reduces multi‑filing gaming and smooths timing for U.S. employers, which blunts Canada’s pitch to frustrated engineers. USCIS Director Ur M. Jaddou put it plainly, “We’re always looking for ways to bolster integrity and curtail the potential for fraud while improving and streamlining our application processes,” in announcing the integrity measures. That means fewer accidental spillovers north as the U.S. process stabilizes.
Ottawa can still pull talent. It already created an open work permit path for H‑1B holders in 2023, and it is sketching a new plan in Budget 2025 per the October 22 speech. Yet IRCC is also tightening flows to align with housing and services, with targets to reduce the non‑permanent resident share by 2027.
Those caps collide with any surge strategy unless exemptions are carved for priority skills. The practical gatekeepers here are the Immigration Minister and provinces running credentialing, not the PMO podium.
Pin Down The Levers
Hitting the export target requires three near‑term controls.
First, Finance and Trade must lock in more non‑US market access and export credit that matches rivals, then measure shipments quarterly against the C$300 billion path.
Second, Transport and Natural Resources must guarantee port capacity, grid additions, and LNG timelines, because missed in‑service dates kill orders.
Third, IRCC must ring‑fence high‑impact visas within a tighter overall intake, or the talent plan dilutes. If two things change, the odds improve fast, provinces pass true mutual recognition on goods and credentials, and USCIS backtracks on reforms, renewing Canada’s relative pull. If not, the 2035 goal slips right.
